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Abstract. Internet of Things is a novel concept that semantically implies a 
world-wide network of uniquely addressable interconnected smart objects. It is 
aimed at establishing any paradigm in computing. This environment is one 
where the boundary between virtual and physical world is eliminated. As the 
network gets loaded with hitherto unknown applications, security threats also 
become rampant. Current security solutions fail as new threats appear to de-
struct the reliability of information. The network has to be transformed to IPv6 
enabled network to address huge number of smart objects. Thus new addressing 
schemes come up with new attacks. Real time analysis of information from the 
heterogeneous smart objects needs use of cloud services. This can fall prey to 
cloud specific security threats. Therefore need arises for a review of security 
threats for a new area having huge demand. Here a study of security issues in 
this domain is briefly presented. 
 
Keywords: Internet of Things, Any Paradigm, Smart Objects, Security Issues, 
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1 Introduction 
 
Kevin Ashton, cofounder and executive director of MIT Auto-ID Centre, first intro-
duced the term “Internet of Things” in 1999 [1]. It is an emerging concept where 
smart objects are equipped with sensors or actuators, tiny microprocessor, communi-
cation interface, and power resource. As per Libelium report [2], it is estimated that 
more than 50 billion devices will be accessing the Internet by the year 2020. The tre-
mendous increase in demand makes mapping of resource constrained sensor nodes 
and Internet a big challenge. The term „Thing‟ used in “Internet of Things” can be 
defined as physical or digital or virtual entity that is capable of being identified [3] to 
integrate heterogeneous data, semantics, and objects. IoT combines several techniques 
such as RFID,Zigbee,Wi-Fi,3G/4G,embedded devices, sensing devices.  
To ensure sensing data availability at any time, at any place, effective processing of 
large amounts of collected sensing data is necessary in the application areas such as 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
environmental monitoring, weather forecasting, transportation, business, healthcare, 
military application etc. Combining wireless sensor networks with cloud makes it 
easy to share and analyze real time sensor data on-the-fly. The issues of storage ca-
pacity may be overcome by low-cost cloud computing technique [4][5]. For security 
and easy access of data, it is widely used in distributed and mobile environment. The 
objective of the integrated sensor-cloud framework is to facilitate the shifting of high 
volume of sensing data from sensor networks to the cloud computing environment; so 
that scientifically and economically feasible data can be fully utilized to visualize the 
concept of next generation Internet i.e. Internet of Things. Figure 1 represents “any” 
paradigm in the context of IoT. In order to provide anytime, anywhere services, a 
number of smart sensing objects attached to Internet have to communicate with each 
other through uniquely assigned identity [6]. This is where128 bits IPv6 steps in. So 
that, it can support 2128 addresses, which is approximately 340 undecillion or 3.4  1038 
addresses. 
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Fig. 1. “Any” Paradigm in IoT 
 
The design of protocol stack for smart objects must be matched with existing Internet 
hosts in order to create the extended Internet, which is the aggregation of Internet with the 
IoT. It is very critical to implement IPv6 in low powered sensing objects. As IPv4 address 
spaces are already used, existing IPv4 (32 bits) enabled systems need to be up-graded to 
IPv6 compatible devices. The huge number of heterogeneous devices being connected to 
one another gives rise to newer security threats. The amount of flexibility and availability 
of information also leads to hitherto unforeseen security breaches. At present, there is a 
lack of analyzers for the new threats in the network. Securing IP based ubiquitous sensor 
network (IPv6 or IPv4-Ipv6) in IoT is of great concern for researchers to meet future 
market demands and satisfaction. In comparison to IPv4, IPv6 provides simplicity, 
improved routing speed, quality of service and security. IPv6 brings signifi-cant assurance 
of a higher level of security and confidentiality of the transmitted data. 
 
 
 
 
 
The heterogeneous, resource-constrained and distributed natures of the network make 
conventional security methodologies inefficient. More research works are required to 
ensure security, performance and interoperability between next generation IoT and 
ex-isting Internet.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the con-
cept of next generation network i.e. IoT. Section 3 illustrates open issues in IoT envi-
ronment. In section 4, possible security threats are explained briefly. Section 5 gives 
basic idea about security solutions in IoT environment. Section 6 discusses about a 
case study in this environment. It is followed by a conclusion in section 7. 
 
2 Next Generation Internet of Things 
 
IoT is an integrated part of future Internet, which may be termed as next generation 
network. Ambient intelligence which is hidden in IoT environment supports people in 
carrying out their everyday activities in an easy and natural way. Radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) is often seen as essential requirement for serving Internet of 
Things. If all objects around the environment are equipped with radio tags, they can 
be easily identified. This technology is very useful in health monitoring applications 
such as automated monitoring of patient‟s heart condition. In order to track patients‟ 
medical history, RFID chips can be implanted in their body. Internet-connected de-
vices can also directly communicate with the required emergency services when 
sensed data shows the sign of deterioration in the patient‟s condition .In this way per-
vasive environment of smart healthcare technique has the capacity to save lives.  
Pervasive computing, which is often similar to ubiquitous computing, is an impor-
tant field of research leading to the domain of IoT. Tremendous developments in 
technologies such as wireless communications, mobile computing, wearable comput-
ers, sensors, RFID tags have led to the evolution of next generation IoT. The goal of 
pervasive computing is to create ambient intelligence where devices embedded in the 
environment always provide services to improve quality of life by hiding underlying 
technologies. In this pervasive environment, intelligent objects are interconnected to 
autonomously collect, process and transport data in a cooperative way, in order to 
adapt IoT concept [7]. It can be said that, IoT is more vulnerable to serious security 
threats than existing network [1] because it includes various constraint such as low 
resource objects, heterogeneous nature, open environment deployment, dynamic na-
ture. In the next section, some of the considerable open issues for security implemen-
tation in IoT are discussed. 
 
3 Open Issues in IoT Environment 
 
In IoT environment, the system needs a flexible security mechanism to update it easi-
ly according to the requirement. Both the user and the system need a secure access 
control and authorization mechanism within the limitations imposed by IoT environ-
ment. Some of the open issues are as follows. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 IoT creates a heterogeneous environment facilitated by mobility of the objects. It 
can give rise to inconsistent interpretations of data collected from different 
domains. Due to distributed and ad-hoc nature, it is open to several unique vulne-
rabilities whose solutions are unknown. There is no central control that can provide 
required security features. Therefore burden of the security features may be too 
large for small and limited capacity objects. 
 In this surrounding, a secure communication channel is needed along with object 
authentication to track interacting objects. But request for establishing secure 
channel is also transmitting through the shared, unreliable wireless medium. There-
fore feasible solution for tracking objects through insecure channel is still in the 
phase of research. 
 If data is shared with unknown objects, the probability of data security reduces 
automatically. The exact criteria for trust establishment between communicating 
parties need to be determined. 
 To work in a smarter way, pervasive environment needs to deal with users‟ 
personal data. But sometimes it poses serious threat to the privacy of the user, 
especially in the situations where people do not want to disclose their detailed 
personal information. 
 
Therefore an intelligent system should be considered to analyze these issues and to 
adapt dynamic mechanism. Next section focuses on possible security threats in IoT 
environment. 
 
4 Possible Security Threats 
 
Various security challenges can arise in heterogeneous features of IoT [8]. There are 
several known attacks in IoT environment whose solutions are available in the mar-
ket. But aim of this paper is to consider novel challenges in IoT environment whose 
feasible solutions are still under research. Most of the security issues such as eave-
sdropping, false routing, message tampering, unauthorized usage, DoS attack are 
common with existing internet. But the issues related to specific attacks may be quite 
different. Some issues like secret extractions, tampering of nodes are more serious in 
IoT environment. This paper considers that security challenges in IoT may occur from 
compromised wireless sensor network, usage of novel IPv6 protocol, integrated cloud 
environment, smart sensing objects. In our previous papers [9][10][11], we have al-
ready discussed about security related issues in wireless sensor network. Now the 
main focus is to identify new threats in IPv6 based integrated sensor-cloud environ-
ment, which is based on number of smart sensing objects. 
 
4.1 Security Attacks Related to IP-Enabled Environment  
 
There are several existing threats in IP-enabled environment. Security in IPv6 is al-
most same as IPv4 security in many ways. IPv6 is normally considered as more se-
cure than IPv4 because version 6 includes the concept of IP Security (IPSec). Beside 
this, some significant differences exist between IPv4 and IPv6 [12]. In the transition 
period, coexistence of IPv4 and IPv6 especially creates problem regarding security 
 
 
 
 
 
issues. It is because transition mechanisms provide new, previously unknown possi-
bilities of intrusion. There are several transition mechanisms, such as tunneling, dual-
stack configurations. It is very important to understand security implications of the 
transition mechanisms in order to apply proper security mechanisms. On dual-stack 
configuration hosts applications can be targeted by both IPv4 and IPv6 attacks. 
Tunneling mechanisms may also bring misuse possibilities. Tunneling, especially 
automatic tunneling can facilitate an intruder to avoid ingress filtering checks. Among 
two major methods of automatic tunneling, "6 to 4" method encapsulates IPv6 packet 
directly into an IPv4 packet and “Teredo" method encapsulates IPv6 packet into an 
IPv4 UDP packet. By misusing 6to4 transition mechanism, a DoS attack can be tar-
geted to IPv6 node, IPv4 node or other 6 to 4 node. In „Teredo” tunneling, all receiv-
ing nodes must allow decapsulation of packets that can be sourced from anywhere. 
This can be a serious security problem. Addresses within IPv4 and IPv6 headers may 
be spoofed to be used for Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In this section, the main 
focus is on new attacks which may arise in IPv6 or IPv6-IPv4 environment. Some of 
the specific attacks in IP enabled network are briefly discussed. 
 
 Reconnaissance Attack 
 
IPv4 reconnaissance attack uses ping sweep and port scan techniques. It can be miti-
gated by filtering certain types of messages used by an intruder. The default subnet 
size of an IPv6 subnet is 64 bits, or 264, compared to the subnet size in IPv4 of 8 bits, 
or 28. This increases the scan size to check each host on a subnet by 264 - 28 (approx-
imately 18 quintillion). So ping sweep and port scan are much more difficult to com-
plete in an IPv6 network. New multicast addresses in IPv6 enable intruder to identify 
key resources such as routers more easily. Additionally, IPv6 networks are even more 
dependent on ICMPv6 to function properly. Aggressive filtering of ICMPv6 can have 
negative effects on network functions. As public services on the network need to be 
reachable with DNS, adversary can attack at least a small number of critical hosts 
within the victim network. DNS Server can be easily compromised because of using 
dynamic DNS mechanisms for large nature of IPv6 addresses and the lack of a strict 
requirement for Network Address Translation (NAT). 
 
 Fragmentation Attack 
 
Minimum recommended MTU size for IPv6 is 1280 octets. IPv6 protocol specifica-
tion does not allow packet fragmentation by intermediary devices. It is recommended 
to drop all fragments less than 1280 octets unless the packet is the last in the flow. 
However an intruder may achieve port numbers by using fragmentation and can by-
pass security monitoring devices. An attacker can also cause overload of reconstruc-
tion buffers on the target system by sending a large number of small fragments, which 
forces a system to crash. 
 
 ICMPv6 Misuse Attack 
 
Some important mechanisms in IPv6 networks, such as neighbor discovery and path 
MTU discovery, are dependent on some types of ICMPv6 messages. ICMPv6 allows 
error notification response to be sent to multicast addresses, which can be misused by 
attacker. An attacker can cause multiple responses targeted at the victim by sending 
packet to a multicast address. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Routing Header Misuse Attack 
 
IP options in IPv4 are replaced with extension headers in IPv6. All IPv6 nodes are 
capable to process routing headers. It is possible that an intruder sends a packet to a 
publicly accessible address with a routing header containing forbidden address i.e. 
address of the victim network. Then the publicly accessible host will forward the 
packet to a destination address stated in the routing header even though that destina-
tion address is filtered.  
There are several known and unknown security threats which can arise in IP 
enabled network. Some of the devastating attacks are discussed here. Next subsection 
describes security threats of the sensor-cloud environment. 
 
4.2 Security Threats of Sensor-Cloud Environment  
 
Sensor-cloud environment can be easily compromised by the adversary because of the 
absence of centralized control[13]. In this virtual environment, main security issue 
includes violation of authentication and leakage in communication channel. As sen-
sor-cloud framework is deployed in distributed environment, there may appear several 
security challenges [14] [15] [16] that comes from the following perspectives. Envi-
ronment of sensor nodes can be compromised or individual sensor can be vulnerable 
to attacks, whose solutions are available. Information flows within the cloud can be 
affected by compromised cloud nodes. The cloud client can be infected by malicious 
code, which can lead to further security breaches within the environment. The com-
munication channels between sensors and cloud and between client and cloud are 
vulnerable to different types of attacks. Some of the typical attacks in this environ-
ment are SPAM over Internet Telephony (SPIT), where an attacker sends bulk unsoli-
cited calls to an enterprise; The spammer attempts to initiate a voice session and then 
relays a prerecorded message if the callee answers; Denial of Service (DoS), which is 
an severe issue for any IP network- based service; Service theft, where an unautho-
rized users get access to the network that results into authentication violation.  
In the next subsection, the main focus is on security risks for the smart objects in 
IoT. 
 
4.3 Security Risks for Smart Objects Which Form Basis of IoT  
 
In IoT environment, the solutions of some known attacks such as man-in-the-middle 
attack, eavesdropping, routing attacks are already known. The transmission phase in 
IoT environment may be vulnerable to man-in-the middle attacks, where it is assumed 
that no third party is able to sit in between the two communicating entities. In com-
pletely automated mechanisms, there is usually no prior knowledge about each other 
and can not always be able to identify intruder. During transmission between smart 
objects in a network, it may be susceptible to eavesdropping, either for insufficient 
protection of communication medium or for use of compromised session key. Routing 
information in IoT can be spoofed, altered, or replayed. Other known relevant routing 
attacks include sinkhole attack or blackhole attack, selective forwarding, wormhole 
attack, sybil attack. Other security threats related to smart sensing objects are as fol-
lows [17][8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Privacy Threat 
 
Tracking of object‟s location and usage may give rise to privacy risk for its users. An 
attacker can gather information about individual object to find out behavioral patterns 
of the users. Such information can be distributed to interested parties for marketing 
purposes. A smart object deployed in the ambient environment can easily be captured 
by an attacker. Such an attacker may then attempt to extract security information to 
misuse it. 
 
 Firmware Replacement Attack 
 
When a smart object is in operation or maintenance phase, its firmware or software 
may be updated to allow for new functionality or new features. An attacker may be 
able to exploit such a firmware upgrade by replacing the object with malicious soft-
ware, thereby influencing the operational behavior of the object. 
 
 Cloning of Smart Objects by Untrusted Manufacturer 
 
During the manufacturing process of a smart object, an untrusted manufacturer can 
easily clone the physical characteristics or security configuration of the object. Cloned 
object may be sold at a cheaper price in the market, and be able to function normally 
as a genuine object. In the worst case, a cloned object can be used to control a genuine 
object. An untrusted manufacturer may also change functionality of the cloned object, 
resulting in degraded functionality with respect to the genuine object. It can also im-
plement additional functionality with the cloned object, such as a backdoor. During 
the installation of object, a genuine object may be substituted with a similar variant of 
lower quality without being detected. The main motivation may be cost savings. Ge-
nuine objects can be reselled in order to gain further financial benefits. Another moti-
vation may be to damage reputation of competitors.  
After going through different security threats from heterogeneous perspective, next 
section focuses on possible security solutions in IoT. 
 
5 Security Solutions in IoT Environment 
 
Security in IoT environment should address the following main issues. 
 
 Enabling smart and intelligent behavior of networked objects. 
 Preservation of privacy for heterogeneous sets of objects. 
 Decentralised authentication and trust model. 
 Energy efficient security solutions. 
 Proper authentication of the objects within the network. 
 Security and trust for cloud computing services. 
 Data ownership. 
 
Security should ensure accurate implementation of confidentiality, integrity, au-
thentication, non-repudiation and access control. Two of the main security issues in 
the IoT are privacy and confidentiality. Because of the scale of deployment and mo-
bility, the cloud of “things” is hard to control. Cryptographic techniques are useful to 
protect confidential information stored in the network and to transfer secure messages 
 
 
 
 
  
 
from one ubiquitous node to another. But there are some gaps between available tech-
niques and requirements. Implementing cryptography into the network of smart ob-
jects creates tremendous challenges. Because traditional mechanisms are slow in 
speed, large in size and consume more power and may fail to provide necessary pro-
tection for sensed data. Lightweight Cryptography[18][19] is a current field of re-
search that can meet the constraints set by the use of smart objects. There is no strict 
criterion for classifying a cryptographic algorithm as lightweight but the basic concept 
is that cryptography techniques need to work by using minimum amount of essential 
resources of target objects. It can be categorized into hardware-oriented and software-
oriented. Hardware-oriented techniques are more applicable in areas where main con-
cern is about the size of chip and number of clock cycles required for its execution. 
Software oriented techniques need to be considered when main focus is on memory 
(Ram and ROM) requirements, and power consumption. Another type of categoriza-
tion is symmetric versus asymmetric. Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms offer 
more security than symmetric, but symmetric technique works well, where authenti-
cation and integrity are of prime importance than non-repudiation and confidentiality. 
This can save additional computational cost and power consumption. Asymmetric 
ciphers are computationally far more demanding in both hardware and software le-
vels. Finally it is the designer‟s decision to choose the appropriate techniques based 
upon the application‟s requirements along with the constraints carried by them.  
In some cases, maximum security can only be achieved by designing an effective 
intrusion detection system which is not intended to prevent attacks. Instead, their 
purpose is to provide alert about possible attacks, ideally in time to stop the attack or 
to mitigate the damage. Researchers have been working for quite some time for de-
signing intrusion detection in wireless sensor network and in IP based network. IoT 
involves heterogeneous network and thus an integration of techniques is needed. Not 
much work has been done in the field of IoT environment. There exist some open 
source IDS systems for IPv4 network. By using software, IDS systems in IPv4 net-
works, procedure of intrusion detection can be automated. In this, intrusion attempt is 
recognized and logged by IDS system and alert is generated. There is no freeware IDS 
software for IPv6 networks. By using packet analyzer tools, an intrusion detection 
procedure will require an efficient network administrator. Therefore IPv6 supporting 
IDS system must consider IPv6 protocol specific features. 
 
 IPv6 defines a new header format, which must be properly recognized by IDS. 
 IDS must implement support for IPv6 extension headers and to check the order of 
extension headers. It is recommended for IDS to discard a packet with an unde-
fined "Next Header" value and to record this as incident. 
 IDS should be capable of detecting duplicate options of Hop-by-Hop option header 
or destination options header. 
 IDS with IPv6 support should also be able to recognize and analyze IPv6 traffic 
tunneled in IPv4. 
 
Some of the existing works on intrusion detection in sensor network based IoT are 
mentioned below. Most of the researches are directed to wireless sensor network 
which is a main component of IoT. The lack of fixed infrastructures and scarce re-
source make WSN difficult to collect audit data for the entire network. It is more 
 
 
 
 
 
difficult to distinguish false alarms and real intrusions. In one of the previous papers 
[9], a survey of recent IDS in sensor network has been presented. In the earlier works, 
different lightweight hierarchical models [10][11] are proposed for heterogeneous 
wireless sensor network to detect DoS type attacks. But a sensor node can utilize most 
of the services offered by traditional IP networks with the help of IP stack. Without a 
proper security framework, it is not possible to grow towards IoT environment. So our 
research work currently focuses on this domain. In [20], a dynamic coding mechan-
ism to implement distributed signature based lightweight IDS has been proposed in IP 
based Ubiquitous Sensor Networks. In [21], intrusion detection and response system 
has been proposed considering different types of attacks arise from internet hosts, 
clients and insider. Main module of the IDS resides on the gateway which supports 
dual stack- one for analyzing packets from Internet (IPA) and another for analyzing 
packets from USN (UPA) for detecting attacks. In [22], a distributed intrusion detec-
tion scheme for IoT has been proposed based on anomaly mining where intrusion 
semantic is analyzed to distinguish intrusion behaviors from anomalies; since all 
anomalies are not triggered by malicious intrusion. In [23], to detect the security 
threats in IoT, artificial immune system is applied where detectors evolve dynamical-
ly to detect new IoT attacks. Newly detected attacks are combined with the attack 
information library to alarm the manager of the IoT. The problem on how to consider 
new class of security threats in IP-enabled IoT is currently a challenging research 
issue.  
Therefore a need of efficient security mechanism specifically tailored for this pur-
pose is inevitable. In the next section, a pervasive environment based real life applica-
tion of IoT has been briefly discussed to give idea about security implementation in 
next generation network. 
 
6 Case Study: Pervasive Environment of Healthcare 
 
A healthcare system based on pervasive environment controls health data in an elec-
tronic format EPR (Electronic Patient Record) as compared to the largely paper-based 
Records[24][25]. As EPRs are kept on networked systems for availability reasons, it 
is accessible from anywhere and is very easy to copy. Examples include confidential 
personal data like HIV status, psychiatric records, genetic information etc. The usage 
of EPRs, imposes new security risks to health data. This may lead to unauthorized 
access and tampering of sensitive EPRs. The pervasive use of wireless techniques 
makes it easy for malicious adversaries to launch security attacks. As healthcare 
systems are designed to assist in medical treatment, security vulnerabilities lead the 
entire system unreliable, putting patients‟ lives at risk. Some of the most possible 
vulnerabilities to this type of healthcare systems include the following. 
 
 In case of emergencies, false alarms may be generated or real alarms may be sup-
pressed by the system. 
 Alteration of health data of specific patients, leading to incorrect diagnosis and 
treatment. 
 
Another concern has been significantly increased over privacy issues, relating to 
electronic health data. Reliable healthcare systems must ensure same level of privacy 
 
 
 
 
  
 
policy for electronic data as applicable to paper based patient records. The main idea 
behind securing it is to preserve patient privacy. To ensure this, care needs to be taken 
to prevent all unauthorized access to EPRs in the system. An important property of a 
medical system is that patients have a high level of control over deciding who ac-
cesses their health information. Two additional issues associated with pervasive 
healthcare systems are security of wireless communication and physical security of 
handheld devices. Pervasive healthcare systems make extensive use of wireless com-
munication technologies to communicate health data collected by sensor networks, 
which have many security vulnerabilities. Portable handheld devices that are used by 
both patients and caregivers, may store sensitive health information about the patient 
and cause a serious privacy breach, if stolen or misplaced. Therefore, physical securi-
ty of the devices also has to be considered.  
Recent development of cloud computing allows systems to store all or selective 
health data in cloud storage and ensures availability with reduced expenditures. In 
cloud design, data is stored on multiple third party servers where the storage can be 
accessed on demand. Migrating health data into the cloud offers enormous conveni-
ence to healthcare service providers because they do not have to worry about the 
complexities of direct hardware management. But user privacy preservation and prop-
er access control of health data are growing concern. A contextual patient-centric 
access policy may be adopted to classify the roles. Security solutions of pervasive 
healthcare systems may focus on protecting health data from different aspects. In 
recent years several promising prototypes for wearable health monitoring have started 
to emerge. These devices are being used for continuous monitoring of patients for a 
long time. But effective security implementation for this type of pervasive applica-
tions is an unexplored area till date. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
IoT is the emerging technology of the present age which consists of the analysis of new 
evolving data from heterogeneous sources for creating a new era of real life applica-tions. 
In this paper, an effort has been made to study the various security issues coming up in 
IoT environment. It is obvious that as IoT deals with a large number of objects, the use of 
wireless sensor network and cloud are almost inevitable. This gives rise to the need for 
transformation from IPv4 to IPv6 based connectivity to handle the huge num-ber of 
embedded smart objects. The use of IPv6 increases flexibility at the cost of vari-ous 
known and unknown security challenges. There have been many works on securing the 
wireless sensor networks already. The main focus in this paper is to study security threats 
in the new IPv6 enabled network, cloud environment and smart sensing “things” in the 
context of IoT. Without proper security framework, intelligence in IoT environ-ment may 
lead to major catastrophe. IoT research and innovation activities need to ad-dress security 
issues to support the growth of a smarter world. The possible solutions such as 
cryptography or intrusion detection etc. have been studied. The authors have considered a 
case study of healthcare system as this is definitely going to be maximum benefited in the 
IoT environment. This field is an emerging domain of research at present. The present 
survey is aimed at the construction of a secure independent living plan for the aged 
persons in the society in near future. 
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